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TRADE EPIDEMIC: THE IMPACT OF THE 
MAD COW CRISIS ON EU-U.S. RELATIONS 
HEATHER BERIT FREEMAN* 
Abstract: When a new illness in cattle appeared in the United Kingdom 
twenty years ago, its ensuing nationwide and global repercussions could 
not have been envisioned. Not only did mad cow disease destroy the 
British cattle industry, it raised the fears of leaders and citizens around 
the world. Wary of tainted British beef, the European Union stepped in 
to attempt to curb the crisis while it was in its infancy. Soon the United 
States, in an effort to protect its own citizens and cattle industry, 
enacted measures banning European cattle products. The effects of the 
peculiar cattle disease reverberated through the global economy, 
heightening trade disputes between the United States and the 
European Union that have yet to achieve resolution. 
INTRODUCTION 
The appearance of mad cow disease in the United Kingdom in 
the 1980s has forever destroyed the image of "the roast beef of Old 
England" throughout Europe and the world.l MagnifYing the gravity 
of this crisis is the "extreme sensitivity of Europeans about the food 
they eat."2 Most European Union (EU) Member States lay claim to 
great culinary traditions. 3 The importance of such traditions means 
that food is taken seriously in the European culture.4 Food scandals, 
thus, are disturbing news, and it comes as no surprise that concern 
over the spread of mad cow disease has had a dramatic effect on beef 
demand in the EU.5 
* Heather Berit Freeman is an Executive Editor for the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review. 
I Graham R. Chambers, The BSE Crisis and the European Parliament, in EU CoMMITTEES: 
SOCIAL REGULATION, LAw AND POLITICS 95, 96 (Christianjoerges & Ellen Vos eds., 1999). 
2 John B. Richardson, Agriculture in the EU and the United States: Common Values 
and Converging Policies, Address Before the National Association of State Departments of 
Agriculture (Mar. 3, 2000), at http:/ /www.eurunion.org/news/speeches/2000 (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2001). 
3 !d. 
4 !d. 
5 !d.; CHARLES E. HANRAHAN, THE EUROPEAN UNION'S BAN ON HORMONE-TREATED 
MEAT 1 (Cong. Research Servs. Short Rep. for Cong. RS20142, 2000). 
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The interdependent relationship between the EU and the United 
States rendered an impact on this country inevitable,6 Together, the 
EU and the United States produce over 50% of global gross domestic 
product (GDP).7 Twenty-four percent of EU exports travel to the 
United States, and 23% of U.S. exports reach the EU.8 Two-way trade 
between the EU and the United States currently grows at a rate of 
10% per year, and the job-creating investment of each government in 
the other's economy sets the relationship apart from all other global 
trade affiliations.9 As of June, 2000, European investment in the 
United States had reached over a half trillion dollars, supporting 
seven million "well-paid" jobs.IO In the past, Europeans worried about 
American takeovers of European business, but recent European take-
overs have reversed that trend.ll 
The outbreak of mad cow disease has prompted the EU to take 
measures in response to the crisis, which include surveillance and 
withdrawal from the food chain of specified risk material (SRM).12 
The panic over mad cow disease in western Europe led U.S. health 
officials to take stringent steps to prevent the disease from taking hold 
on this side of the Atlantic.I3 Furthermore, mad cow disease is cred-
ited with creating an environment unfavorable to resolving an ongo-
ing EU-U.S. dispute over the use of genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs) in food production.14 The ED's ban on GMOs is governed by 
the World Trade Organization (WI'O) Agreement on Sanitary and 
6 See generally Fraser Cameron, The EU and US: Good Friends-Tough Negotiators, 
Presentation at the European Chamber of Commerce Lunch (June 12, 2000), at 
http:/ /www.eurunion.org/news/speeches/2000. 
7 /d. 
8fd. 
9 /d. 
10 /d. 
II Cameron, supra note 6. 
12 Press Release, Council of Ministers, 2309th Council Meeting-AGRICULTURE-
Brussels, (Nov. 20, 2000), available at LEXIS, European Union Library, News File 
[hereinafter Council Meeting]. SRM include sheep and goat heads, spleens from animals 
of any age, spinal cords from animals greater than a year old, and the following bovine 
materials: the entire head-including the eyes but excluding the tongue, spinal cord, 
thymus, tonsils, spleen, and intestines from cattle greater than six months old. Paul Brown 
et al., Bovine Spongifurm Encephalopathy and Variant Creutz.Jeldtjakob Disease: Background, 
Evolution, and Current Concerns, in EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES (2001), available at 
http:/ /www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/v7nl.pdf (as of Dec. 22, 2001). 
13 Sandra Blakeslee, Stringent Steps Taken by U.S. on Cow Illness, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 14, 2001, 
at AI. 
14 CHARLES E. HANRAHAN, U.S. EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL TRADE: FOOD SAFETY AND 
BIOTECHNOLOGY ISSUES 2 (Cong. Research Servs. Rep. for Cong. 98-861, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter AGRICULTURAL TRADE]. 
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Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) .15 The SPS Agreement for-
bids the implementation of measures that are not based on scientific 
principles and assessment of risk.16 Thus, the disagreement over the 
EU's GMO prohibition is a critical irritant in the EU-U.S. trade rela-
tionship.17 
This Note examines the trade hindrances between the EU and 
the United States resulting from the mad cow epidemic in Europe. 
Further, it considers proposals for repairing the trade relationship. 
Part I provides a background on the disease itself and the ensuing 
European crisis. Part II focuses on measures enacted by the EU to 
control the outbreak. Part III examines the U.S. response to the EU 
actions. Part IV considers the WfO measures and the ensuing GMO 
dispute between the EU and the United States. Part V explores recent 
developments and the possibility for resolution of EU-U .S. differ-
ences. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as 
mad cow disease, is a chronic degenerative disease affecting the cen-
tral nervous system of cattle.18 First diagnosed in Great Britain in 
1986, BSE derives its name from the sponge-like appearance of in-
fected cattle's brain tissue when sections are examined under a micro-
scope.19 Animals affected by the epidemic may display changes in 
temperament, such as nervousness or aggression, abnormal posture, 
incoordination and difficulty in rising, decreased milk production, or 
loss of body weight despite continued appetite.2° Most cases of mad 
cow disease in the United Kingdom have occurred in dairy cows rang-
ing in age from three to six years.21 The causative agent of BSE has 
15 Id. at 1. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 3. 
18 U.S. Dep't of Agric. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Serv., Bovine spongiform En-
cephalnpathy (Jan., 2001), at http:/ /www.aphis.usda.gov:80joa/pubs/fsbse.html (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2001) [hereinafter BSE (Jan., 2001) ]. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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not been characterized completely, and currently there is no treat-
ment to prevent the disease.22 All infected cattle die.23 
A time period of two to eight years ensues from the point at 
which an animal becomes infected until it first shows signs of BSE.24 
Following the onset of clinical signs, the condition deteriorates until 
the cow dies or is destroyed; this process takes between two weeks and 
six months.25 Because at this time there is no process by which to de-
tect the disease in a live animal, veterinary pathologists must confirm 
BSE by postmortem microscopic examination of an animal's brain 
tissue.26 The only method available to study the possible presence of 
BSE in live cattle is to inoculate other animals (usually mice) with ma-
terial that may be infected with the disease.27 Detecting the agent 
through mouse inoculation studies, however, may take a long time 
(up to 700 days), "and failure to identify it in tissues may indicate ei-
ther true absence of the agent or simply the limited sensitivity of cur-
rent diagnostic methods. "28 
Data suggests that mad cow disease is an extended common 
source epidemic involving animal feed containing contaminated meat 
and bone meal as a protein meat source.29 No evidence exists indicat-
ing that BSE spreads horizontally-between unrelated adult cattle or 
from cattle to other species. 30 Limited research shows that vertical or 
maternal transmission may occur at a negligible level. 31 Results of re-
search conducted in the United Kingdom indicate that there is 
roughly a nine percent increase in the occurrence of BSE in offspring 
of BSE-affected cattle.32 This research suggests that the BSE epidemic 
cannot be attributed to maternal transmission alone. 33 BSE in the 
United Kingdom may be attributed to feeding cattle protein pro-
duced from carcasses of other cattle or sheep infected with a related 
22 /d. 
23 BSE (Jan., 2001), supra note 18. 
24 /d. 
25 /d. 
26 /d. 
27 /d. 
28 BSE (Jan., 2001), supra note 18. 
29 Id. 
50 /d. 
31 /d. 
32 U.S. Dep't of Agric. Animal and Plant Health Inspection Serv., Bovine Spongifurm En-
cephalopathy (BSE), at http:/ /www.aphis.usda.gov:80/oa/bse/index.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 
2001) [hereinafter BSEfactsheet]. 
33 /d. 
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disease.34 Scientists believe that changes in the animal feed produc-
tion process in the early 1980s allowed the sickening agent in infected 
carcasses to survive, thereby contaminating the protein supplement 
and infecting live cattle.35 BSE is classified as a transmissible spongi-
form encephalopathy (TSE), forms of which affect sheep and goats 
(scrapie), deer and elk (chronic wasting disease), domestic and wild 
cats (feline spongiform encephalopathy), and humans (Creutzfeldt-
Jakob Disease, hereinafter CJD).36 
B. New Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease 
Shortly after the 1986 identification of the first case of BSE in the 
United Kingdom, people expressed concern about the possibility that 
humans might become infected with the disease.37 The United King-
dom established the CJD Surveillance Unit, although concerns about 
human infection were muted by the presumptions that BSE origi-
nated from scrapie and that it was not a human pathogen. 38 Alterna-
tively, if BSE originated from a spontaneous mutation, early studies of 
the new TSE were unable to predict whether or not humans might be 
infected.39 Regardless of scientists' ability to foresee transmission of 
BSE to humans, reported cases of CJD in high risk groups did not in-
crease in the ten years after the first case of BSE was identified.40 In-
stead, CJD continued to occur in the general population at the same 
rate as before BSE appeared.41 Then, between May and October, 
1995, the CJD Surveillance Unit received notification that CJD had 
been identified in three patients, aged sixteen, nineteen, and twenty-
nine.42 What was particularly unusual about these diagnoses was the 
comparative youth of the three victims. 43 By March, 1996, a total of 
ten cases of CJD in young people had been reported in the United 
Kingdom, and scientists had confirmed that no "young CJD patients 
in other European countries had the clinical and neuropathologic 
features of the UK cases. "44 A report of the ten cases concluded that a 
M BSE (Jan., 2001), supra note 18. 
M Brown, supra note 12. 
ll6 BSE (Jan., 2001), supra note 18. 
37 Brown, supra note 12. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 ld. 
41 ld. 
42 Brown, supra note 12. 
43 See id. 
44 ld. 
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previously unrecognized form of CJD occurs in persons forty-five years 
of age and younger. 45 
New variant Creutzfeldt:Jakob Disease (nvCJD) affects humans 
and has been linked to consumption of BSE-infected beef, augment-
ing global fears about the spread of mad cow disease.46 The 
identification of nvCJD came nearly a decade after the earliest reports 
of BSE. 47 Thus, assuming that the first case of nvCJD echoes the earli-
est exposure to BSE, the incubation period for the human illness 
could be ten to fifteen years.48 If this is true, the rapid increase of cat-
tle infected with BSE in the late 1980s could lead to a parallel increase 
of nvCJD in the next few years. 49 
C. Crisis in Europe 
Since November, 1986, 183,215 head of cattle have been diag-
nosed with BSE.5° The mad cow epidemic peaked in January, 1993, 
when roughly 1000 new cases were reported each week.51 As a result 
of the disease, the British livestock industry has suffered a substantial 
blow-179,804 cases of BSE have been confirmed in the United 
Kingdom alone. 52 Agriculture officials in the UK have taken a series of 
actions to eradicate BSE.53 These actions include making BSE a 
notifiable disease, prohibiting the inclusion of mammalian meat and 
bone meal in feed for all food-producing animals, barring the inclu-
sion of animals more than thirty months of age in the animal and 
human food chains, and destroying all cattle showing signs of BSE 
and other cattle at high risk of developing the disease. 54 UK veterinary 
officials, however, made no attempt to conceal their hostility to EU 
inspectors looking at BSE issues and expressed resentment at EU im-
plications that BSE is a "political issue. "55 The result of the UK hostil-
ity meant that there were no inspections by the EU between 1990 and 
45 !d. 
46 See BSE (Jan., 2001), supra note 18. 
47 Brown, supra note 12. 
48 !d. 
49 !d. 
50 Court of Auditors, Follow up to Special Report No. 19/98 on BSE, together with the 
Commission's Replies, 2001 OJ. (C 324) 1, 7 [hereinafter Follow up]. Statistics current as 
of May 31, 2001. !d. 
51 BSE (Jan., 2001), supra note 18. 
52 !d.; Follow up, supra note 50, at 7. 
55 BSE (Jan., 2001), supra note 18. 
54Jd. 
55 Chambers, supra note 1, at 99. 
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1994-crucial years in the development of the UK epidemic.56 The 
EU inspections could have discovered that a cattle identification 
scheme employed by the United Kingdom worked better in theory 
than in practice, that production of the meat and bone meal causing 
the problem continued, and that it was cross-contaminating ruminant 
feed in the United Kingdom and being exported to the rest of Europe 
without adequate labels and without being traced to end-use.57 
Officials now attribute the primary emergence of BSE in the United 
Kingdom to the proportion of sheep carcasses in protein supple-
ments, noting that scrapie infections in British sheep most likely were 
higher in the United Kingdom than elsewhere.58 
In addition to the epidemic in the United Kingdom, mad cow 
disease also has been confirmed in native-born animals in Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland.59 
Germany is the most recent victim of the crisis in Europe. GO Mter per-
sistently denying that the problem concerned the nation, Germany 
admitted the presence of BSE-affected cattle on their soil, and in early 
2001, announced their plan to slaughter 400,000 animals.61 
In September, 2001, a mad cow was discovered in Japan, and a 
second case of the disease was confirmed two months later.62 Al-
though the risk of BSE emerging had been apparent since the 1990s 
because of Japan's past imports of livestock as well as meat from the 
United Kingdom and other EU countries, the Japanese government 
appears to have ignored the warnings.63 Officials have not detected 
any cases of BSE in the United States, and the one case of BSE in 
Canada was found in a single cow imported from the United King-
dom.64 Animal health officials in Canada destroyed the affected cow 
and all of its herd-mates, as well as other cattle determined to be at 
risk.65 
56 !d. 
57 !d. 
58 Brown, supra note 12. 
59 BSE (Jan., 2001 ), supra note 18. 
60 See Tony Judt, Europe Is One-Until Disaster Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2001, at A19. 
61 !d. 
62 Bethan Hutton, It Took just One Dairy Cow to Change the Lives of Millions, FIN. TIMES 
(LONDON), Nov. 22, 2001, at 14. 
63 !d. 
64 BSE factsheet, supra note 32. 
65 !d. 
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On March 20, 1996, the UK's Spongiform Encephalopathy Advi-
sory Committee (SEAC) announced the identification of ten cases of 
nvCJD.66 The probable explanation for the incidents was linkage to 
BSE exposure before a 1989 measure banning human consumption 
of brain, spinal cord, and other organs with potential BSE infectivity.67 
As of September 22, 2001, there had been 110 cases of nvCJD world-
wide: 106 in the UK, three in France, and one in Ireland.68 The re-
ports of nvCJD have turned what was initially a veterinary problem 
into a public health problem.69 Young people are falling victim to a 
disease that historically has affected only people over fifty. 70 
For many European consumers, their rejection of beef was not 
necessarily the apprehension of developing nvCJD, but the revelation 
that "the agro-industry was producing beef by feeding ground-up 
dead cattle to live ones (turning herbivores into carnivores and carni-
vores into cannibals, as some observers put it). "71 The depicted indus-
try which, from one point of view, is an effective method for "recy-
cling protein and dealing in Europe with twelve million tons a year of 
animal waste which otherwise has to be disposed of, is an industry 
which operates in the shadows of public knowledge. Very few people 
want to know what happens there. "72 BSE illuminated this operation, 
"and the public, for the most part, did not like what was revealed. "73 
As a result, the outbreak of mad cow disease in Europe has high-
lighted the issue of hygiene in slaughterhouses, factories, and butcher 
shops.74 
II. EU ACTION 
As a result of the mad cow crisis, public health and food safety, 
which gradually were entering the political agenda of both the EU 
and its Member States, have been forced into the foreground.75 In 
response to early reports of a crisis in the United Kingdom, the EU 
took preventative measures by adopting a directive on livestock pro-
66 BSE (Jan., 2001), supra note 18. 
67 Id. 
68 Kevin Toolis, Epidemic in Waiting, THE GuARDIAN (LONDON), Sept. 22, 2001, at 20. 
69 Chambers, supra note 1, at 96. 
70 See id. 
71 !d. at 97. 
72 Id. 
73 !d. 
74 Chambers, supra note 1, at 97. 
75 !d. at 96-97. 
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duction.76 Effective January 1, 1989, the directive banned the use of 
growth-promoting hormones in livestock production. 77 Although 
there is no link between GMOs and the BSE crisis, consumers often 
make one, and the EU has been pressured to act accordingly.78 The 
1989 directive also banned the use of hormones in meats and meat 
products imported into the EU on or after January 1, 1989.79 Thus, 
the ban effectively eliminated most U.S. red meat and meat product 
exports to the EU, costing the U.S. beef industry an estimated $97 
million per year.80 
On July 28, 1989, the EU placed restrictions on the dispatch of 
certain live cattle from the United Kingdom, as a result of the BSE 
outbreak.81 The following year, the EU limited the dispatch of calves 
under six months old, restricted the dispatch of certain bovine tissues 
and organs from the United Kingdom, and mandated notification of 
confirmed cases of BS£.82 The dispatch of live cattle and all cattle 
products from the United Kingdom was banned completely in March, 
1996.83 From 1996 on, as officials diagnosed BSE in cattle in individ-
ual Member States, eradication programs were put into place and re-
vised, as needed.84 To date, EU eradication programs for BSE govern 
in Portugal, the United Kingdom, France, and Ireland.85 
In a November, 2000 European Council (EC) meeting on agri-
culture, EU officials confirmed the need to guarantee the highest 
level possible of consumer protection and to win back consumer 
confidence.86 The EC also reiterated the importance of measures 
taken with regard to traceability, including labeling of processed 
products and the withdrawal of SRM.87 Recapping EU measures al-
ready in place, the EC listed surveillance measures for the detection, 
76 Terrence P. Stewart et al., Trade and Cattle: How the System Is Failing An Industry in Cri-
sis, 9 MINN.j. GLOBAL TRADE 449,500 (2000). 
77 /d. 
78 See Marjorie Miller, Europe Has New Beef with Biotech Foods, L.A. TIMES, jan. 7, 2001, at 
Cl. 
79 Stewart et al., supra note 76, at 500. 
80 /d. 
81 For a description of such restrictions, see generally European Comm'n, Community 
Legislation on BSE, at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/bse/bse15_en.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Community Legislation]. 
82 See id. 
83 /d. 
84 See id. 
85 /d. 
86 Council Meeting, supra note 12. 
87 /d. 
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control, and eradication of BSE, a ban on feeding mammalian meat 
and bone meal to ruminants, policies on the treatment of animal 
waste, withdrawal from the food chain of SRM from the bovine spe-
cies, and the implementation of a monitoring program.88 The EC fur-
ther noted that the Member States bear the responsibility of ensuring 
that all EU measures are implemented strictly and emphasized EC 
harmonization of the approach to combating BSE.89 Furthermore, 
officials at the EC meeting on agriculture took note of France's ac-
tions, which have included destruction of SRM and a ban on the ex-
port of products that have been banned or suspended in France-
such as T-hone steaks, meat and bone meal, and fats from bones-
until the situation has been assessed fully at the EC level.9° Finally, the 
EC announced that Member States of destination may apply 
precautionary measures to the exportation of whole carcasses and 
living cattle.9I 
On December 4, 2000, the EC announced a decision concerning 
certain protection measures with regard to TSEs and the feeding of 
animal protein.92 This decision was enacted to prevent cases of BSE 
from entering into the feed chain and was passed pursuant to an 
opinion of the EU's Scientific Steering Committee, which was 
adopted in November, 2000.93 Cited as a precautionary measure, the 
decision temporarily bans the use of animal proteins in animal feed, 
effective January 1, 2001.94 To accomplish this objective, the ban pro-
hibits feeding processed animal proteins to farmed animals that are 
kept, fattened, or bred for production of food.95 Moreover, it prohib-
its placing on the market processed animal proteins intended for 
feeding farmed animals which are kept, fattened, or bred for the pro-
duction of food.96 Another Council decision, also effective January 1, 
2001, requires testing for all slaughtered cattle over the age of thirty 
months.97 The Council believes that testing all slaughtered animals 
over thirty months will provide a fuller picture of the true extent and 
88 /d. 
89 /d. 
90 Id. 
91 Council Meeting, supra note 12. 
92 Council Directive 2000/766/EC, 2000 OJ. (L 306) 32. 
93 ld. 
94 /d. 
95 Id. 
96 /d. 
97 Council Decision 2001/8/EC, 2001 OJ. (L 2) 28. 
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distribution of mad cow disease.98 In addition to mandatory testing, 
the European Commission (Commission) developed a purchase for 
destruction scheme in December, 2000.99 Under this plan, bovine 
animals over thirty months of age can be purchased for destruction 
instead of being slaughtered for human consumption.IOO The manda-
tory testing provisions for slaughtered cattle over thirty months apply 
to animals that are purchased for destruction)OI 
European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection 
David Byrne stated that the decisions effective january 1, 2001 are the 
minimum measures necessary to begin the process of rebuilding con-
sumer confidence in the safety of European beef.102 The discovery of 
BSE in animals under thirty months, however, raises the question of 
whether the age limit for testing for mad cow disease should be re-
duced from the current requirement of thirty months.l03 Further-
more, the case for further EU measures in relation to mechanically 
recovered meat is very strong.104 While the EU has taken significant 
measures to combat the BSE epidemic, individual Member States, es-
pecially those with the highest occurrence of the disease, continue to 
implement their own measures.I05 
A follow up report released by the Court of Auditors on Novem-
ber 20, 2001 found that the EU action plan that has been developed 
to deal with the BSE crisis is adequate, but implementation by Mem-
ber States remains problematic.l06 Poor surveillance and poor imple-
mentation of the ban on mammalian meat and bone meal in rumi-
nant feed have been cited as potential explanations as to why BSE has 
not been eradicated.107 According to the Court of Auditors' report, 
there is evidence that the agro-feed industry has not been rigorous in 
98 For a greater description, see David Byrne, Latest Developments in Relation to BSE, 
Address to Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament (jan. 23, 2001), at http:// 
europa.eu.int/ comm/ dgs/health_consumer /library I speeches/ speech78_en.htm [herein-
after Latest Developments]. 
99 Commission Regulation 2777/2000, 2000 OJ. (L 321) 47; see Council Decision 
2001/8/EC, 2001 OJ. (L 2) 28. 
1oo See Council Decision 2001/8/EC, 2001 OJ. (L 2) 28. 
101 See id. 
1o2 Latest Developments, supra note 98. 
103 ld. 
104 ld. 
105 Comm 'n of the European Communities, Frequently Asked Questions about BSE, RAPID, 
Nov. 29, 2000, available at LEXIS, European Union Library, News File. 
106 Follow up, supra note 50, 1[ 47. 
107 ld., 48. 
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its implementation of the EU's BSE legislation.108 In consideration of 
these shortcomings, the report recommends consideration of whether 
the Commission should be given temporary emergency powers when 
Member States disagree with proposals related to protection of animal 
or human health)09 The report further suggests the possibility of ex-
cluding funding from market measures where inspections reveal 
significant non-compliance with EU measures. no 
III. U.S. AcTION 
In the United States, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APHIS) and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), 
divisions of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), joined to-
gether to lead the USDA's actions in the prevention, monitoring, and 
control ofBSE in U.S. livestock and food supply.m In 1988, the USDA 
established a BSE working group to review available science and rec-
ommend appropriate regulatory controls.112 The next year, a ban was 
enacted on the importation of live ruminants, including cattle, sheep, 
and goats, and most ruminant products from the United Kingdom 
and other countries reporting cases of BSE.ll3 The USDA began edu-
cational outreach and initiated active surveillance of brains of U.S. 
cattle in 1990.114 Surveillance measures expanded throughout the 
1990s; notably, in 1993 the USDA increased to include examination of 
brain tissue from "downer cows," and in 1994, new technology of test-
ing brains was incorporated)l5 
In 1997, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued 
regulations to prohibit feeding most mammalian proteins to animals 
at risk of developing TSEs.116 The FDA regulation took effect on June 
5, 1997 and was designed as a preventive measure to protect animals 
108 /d. 1 52. 
109 /d., 55. 
110 /d. 
ll1 For the text of the USDA's efforts, see U.S. Dep't of Agric., Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Serv., Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Response Plan Summary 
(Oct., 1998), available at http:/ /www.aphis.usda.gov/oa/bse/bseum.pdf [hereinafter Re-
sponse Plan]. 
112 U.S. Dep't of Agric., Animal and Plant Health Inspection Serv., USDA Actions to Pre-
vent Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), available at http:/ /www.aphis.usda.gov (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2001) [hereinafter USDA Actions]. 
113 /d. 
114 /d. 
115 /d. 
116 /d. 
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from BSE and related diseases as well as to "minimize any potential 
risk to humans."117 Also in 1997, the USDA prohibited importation of 
live ruminants and most ruminant products from all of Europe.ns 
Finding that BSE could become established in the United States if 
certain meat and other animal products and byproducts from BSE 
affected cattle were imported and fed to animals in the United States, 
APHIS stated that the ban on products from all of Europe was based 
on evidence that the BSE agent might be present throughout 
Europe.119 Surveillance of fallen stock increased even further in 2000, 
and the USDA regionalized states in order to increase coverage.12o As 
of December 7, 2000, the USDA prohibited all imports of rendered 
animal protein products, regardless of species, from Europe.l21 The 
USDA cited a recent determination by the EU that feed of non-
ruminant origin was potentially cross-contaminated with the BSE 
agent.l22 
On January 17, 2001, a standard check at a Purina Mills plant in 
Gonzales, Texas revealed that ruminant material accidentally had 
been mixed with cattle feed, in violation of the 1997 FDA regulation 
banning mammalian protein in sheep and cattle feed.123 The com-
pany immediately notified federal officials and reclaimed all of the 
feed, although 1222 animals consumed the feed before any action was 
taken.I24 The discovery of ruminant material in the feed rose specula-
tion that potential problems in U.S. defenses against mad cow disease 
might exist.I25 Mter testing the feed, however, the FDA "determined 
that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-
one-half grams-approximately a quarter ounce--of prohibited mate-
rial. "126 The FDA also noted that the prohibited material was of U.S. 
117 U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Talll Paper, FDA Prohibits Mammalian Protein in 
Sheep and Cattle Feed, (June 3, 1997), at http:/ /vm.cfsan.fda.gov/-lrd/tpprotei.hun. 
118 USDA Actions, supra note 112. 
119 Restrictions on the Importation of Ruminants, Meat and Meat Products from Ru-
minants, and Certain Other Ruminant Products, Fed. Reg. 406, 407 (Jan. 6, 1998) (to be 
codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 94, 96). 
1l!O USDA Actions, supra note 112. 
l%1Jd. 
122 Id. 
m The FDA announced the finding in Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., 
FDA Announces Test Results from Texas Feed Lot (Jan. 30, 2001), available at http:/ I 
www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2001/new00752.htm [hereinafter Test Results]; Tina Res-
man, Purina Mills Recalls Feed after Some Is Found to Contain Banned Materia~ ST. Loms PosT-
DISPATCH, jan. 27, 2001, at 6. 
124 Jd. 
125 Hesman, supra note 123, at 6. 
126 Test Results, supra note 123. 
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origin and, therefore, not likely to contain BSE-infected ruminants.l27 
Despite the negligible risk that the feed was contaminated, Purina 
Mills voluntarily purchased all 1222 of the animals that mistakenly 
were fed the material,l2S Therefore, meat from those cattle will not 
enter the human food supply.l29 According to the FDA, "[t]his epi-
sode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is 
essential for protecting the food supply. "130 
On March 23, 2001, the USDA removed a flock of roughly 126 
quarantined sheep in Vermont; this action followed the removal of 
234 sheep from another Vermont farm a few days earlier.l31 When the 
sheep were imported from Belgium and the Netherlands in 1996, 
they were placed under federal restrictions as a part of the USDA's 
scrapie control efforts.l32 In 1998, the State of Vermont imposed a 
quarantine on the flocks after the USDA learned that sheep from 
Europe probably had been exposed to BSE-contaminated feed.l33 In 
July, 2000, several sheep from the flocks tested positive for a TSE, 
leading the USDA to issue a declaration of extraordinary emergency 
to acquire the sheep.134 The owners of the flocks contested the USDA 
action, but a U.S. District Court ordered the removal of the sheep.135 
The USDA planned to euthanize the sheep humanely and collect tis-
sue samples for diagnostic testing)36 
On November 30, 2001, the USDA released a study conducted by 
the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis showing that the danger of BSE 
occurring in the United States was "extremely low."137 The report in-
dicated that early protection systems implemented by the USDA and 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in large 
part have been "responsible for keeping BSE out of the U.S. and 
121 Jd. 
128 !d. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Agric., USDA Removes Quarantined 
Sheep from Second Vermont Farm (Mar. 23, 2001), available at http:/ /www.usda.tgov/ 
news/releases/2001/03/0053.htm [hereinafter Quarantined Sheep]. 
132 Jd. 
133 Jd. 
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136 Quarantined Sheep, supra note 131. 
137 See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Harvard Study Shows Very Low Risk 
of BSE in the United States (Nov. 30, 2001), available at http:/ /www.usda.gov/news/re-
leases/2001/11/024l.htm. 
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would prevent it from spreading if it ever did enter the country. "138 
Despite identifying the low risk of BSE, the Harvard report outlined 
actions that would continue strengthening U.S. programs to reduce 
that threat.139 Actions the USDA and HHS plan to take in response to 
the report include increasing the number of BSE tests conducted in 
fiscal year 2002, outlining additional regulatory actions that may be 
taken to reduce the potential risk of exposure and ensure potential 
infectious materials do not enter the U.S. food supply, and publishing 
an Advance Notice of Rulemaking to consider additional regulatory 
options for disposal of dead stock on farms and ranches.140 
IV. EU-U.S. TRADE 
A. BSE and the Meat Market 
In January, 2001, European Commissioner for Agriculture and 
Rural Development Franz Fischler announced that BSE has had a 
significant impact on the EU's beef market.141 Specifically, Mr. Fisch-
ler declared that, because of other countries' bans on EU beef, "a 
considerable backlog of production that should normally have taken 
place in 2000 [was] carried over into 2001."142 Globally, the reduction 
in beef consumption in 2000 may have been more than 10%.143 In the 
EU, beef consumption in 2000 had plunged by 27%.144 The rejection 
of EU beef by countries, including the United States, meant that the 
EU could expect a surplus of795 metric tons in 2001, assuming a 10% 
drop in consumption and full use of the EU's purchase for destruc-
tion scheme.145 If used by qualifying EU Member States, the purchase 
for destruction scheme alone could comprise 500 metric tons of the 
ED's 2001 beef surplus.146 Roughly 57,000 animals had been slaugh-
1~Jd. 
159 Jd. 
140 Id. 
141 See generally Press Release, European Commission, Outcome of the Agriculture 
Council, 29 January 2001, BSE and the Beef Market (Jan. 30, 2001), available at http:/ I 
europa.eu.int/ comm/ dgs/health_consumer /library I press/ press! 05 I en.htm [hereinafter 
BSE and the Beef Market]. 
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146 See BSE and the Beef Market, supra note 141. As of january 30, 2001, the purchase 
for destruction scheme had begun in France, Ireland, and to a lesser extent, in Spain and 
Luxembourg; Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Greece had not started implementing the 
plan. Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark are exempt from the plan, and 
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tered under the purchase for destruction scheme, as of January 30, 
2001.147 According to the U.S. Meat Export Federation, the full or 
partial bans that more than forty countries have placed on imports of 
EU beef affected about 240,000 metric tons of beef during the first 
half of200J.l48 
While the EU beef market has suffered as a result of the BSE cri-
sis, the USDA announced in December, 2000 that U.S. exporters may 
benefit from the EU's ban on the use of meat and bone meal in live-
stock feed rations.I49 For the United States, the more important re-
percussions of the meat and bone meal ban would be the prohibition 
of trade of this product into and from the EU and the arising U.S. ex-
port opportunities.l50 As of December 1, 2000, the EU was the world's 
largest exporter of meat and bone meal.l51 In 1999, the EU exported 
561,241 metric tons of meat and bone meal, while U.S. exports of the 
product totaled 381,493 metric tons in the same year}52 Because of 
the EU's recent restrictions, countries that import meat and bone 
meal from the EU "may be forced to seek alternate suppliers of ani-
mal protein meals. "153 The possible increase in U.S. exports as a result 
of the BSE crisis in the EU will depend "upon [U.S.] supply availabil-
ity, prices, and whether ... potential export markets are aware of the 
quality of [U.S. meat and bone meal]."l54 
In March, 2001, the Wall Street journal reported that, after years of 
dwindling sales, "the horse-meat business is booming," largely because 
horses do not carry BSE.l55 A good deal of the horse meat comes from 
the United States and Canada, where "the dogs of the horse world are 
selling at wildly high prices thanks to a sudden increase in demand 
Austria and Belgium have asked for exemptions. Id. Before the passage of the EU legisla-
tion, the United Kingdom already had its own purchase for destruction scheme in place 
for animals over thirty months. Id. 
147 Id. France and Ireland accounted for 60% and 28%, respectively. Id. 
148 Holly Hubbard Preston, Cattle Crises Reverberate Through the World Economy, lNT'L 
HERALD TRIB., Aug. 18, 2001 at 13. 
149 U.S. Dep't of Agric., Foreign Agric. Serv., Does the EU's BSE Crisis Present opportunities 
for U.S. Exporters?, WKLY. MKT. REP.: DAIRY, LIVESTOCK, & PouLTRY, Dec. 1, 2001, available 
at http:/ /www.fas.usda.gov/dlp/highlights/00-12/wmr_120l.pdf [hereinafter Opportuni-
ties for U.S. Exporters]. 
150 Id. 
151 Jd. 
152 Jd. 
153 Id. 
154 opportunities for U.S. Exporters, supra note 149. 
155 Jonathan Eig, Horse d'Oeuvres? Mister Ed Becomes the Other Red Meat, WALL ST.j., Mar. 
30,2001, atAl. 
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for horse meat in Europe. "156 At a recent horse auction in Indiana, 
the biggest horses sold for around $900, "up more than [50%] from 
what they would have fetched [in September, 2000] and nearly as 
much as a full-grown cow might sell for."157 In 1996, the United States 
exported roughly 17,000 tons of horse meat to Europe, but the num-
bers fell to less than 10,000 tons in 2000.158 Exports rose in January, 
2001, however, and "meat companies [said] slaughter rates [were] 
climbing. "159 Although demand has risen for horse meat, supply has 
remained nearly constant, so "U.S. exporters may not profit much 
from the upswing" in demand.l60 The price of horse meat in Europe 
rose about 20% in the first three months of 2001, and producers have 
expressed concerns that if the prices continue to increase, demand 
might stop.161 
C. The Hormone-Treated Meat Dispute 
1. The EU Hormone Ban 
The Commission enacted its ban on production and importation 
of meat derived from animals treated with growth-promoting hor-
mones in 1985, and the ban took effect on January 1, 1989.162 The 
Commission's justification for the ban was that it was necessary to pro-
tect the health and safety of European consumers from the illegal and 
unregulated use of hormones in livestock production in several coun-
tries.163 Political and economic considerations reinforced consumer 
concerns about the use of hormones; these concerns may have played 
a role in the Commission's prohibition of their use.l64 Under the EU's 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), beef benefited from high domes-
tic subsidies in the form of price supports and high tariffs to protect it 
from import competition.l65 By 1985, beef surpluses were so immense, 
the EU policy-makers were willing to support any measure that would 
limit beef imports that might compete with domestic production and 
156 /d. 
157 /d. 
158 /d. 
!59 /d. 
160 Eig, supra note 155, at Al. 
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162 HANRAHAN, supra note 5. 
16~ /d. 
164 !d. 
165 /d. 
360 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 25:343 
interfere with the operation of the CAP.166 Even though the BSE epi-
demic bears no relation to hormone use, concern about mad cow dis-
ease in Europe has created a climate adverse to resolution of the meat 
hormone issue.167 
2. World Trade Organization Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures 
The WTO's SPS Agreement entered into force on January 1, 
1995.168 As defined in the SPS Agreement, an SPS measure is any pa-
rameter applied: 
1) To protect animal or plant life or health within the terri-
tory of the member from risks arising from the entry, estab-
lishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organ-
isms, or disease-causing organisms; 2) to protect human or 
animal life or health within the territory of the member 
from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins, or 
disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages, or foodstuffs; 
3) to protect human life or health within the territory of the 
member from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, 
plants, or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment, 
or spread of pests; or 4) to prevent or limit other damage 
within the territory of the member from the entry, estab-
lishment, or spread ofpests.169 
Under the SPS Agreement, each country may set its own food safety 
and animal and plant health standards based on risk assessment and a 
determination of an acceptable level of risk.17° A member's right to 
take measures necessary for the protection of human, animal, or 
plant life or health is qualified, however, by three limitations.171 SPS 
measures "must be applied only to the extent necessary, must be 
based on scientific principles, and must not be maintained without 
sufficient scientific evidence. "172 While the SPS Agreement does rec-
ognize the right of individual countries to maintain standards that are 
166 /d. 
167 AGRICULTURAL TRADE, sufrra note 14, at 2. 
168 Stewart et al., sufrra note 76, at 500. 
169 Kevin C. Kennedy, Resolving International Sanitary and Phytosanitary Disputes in the 
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stricter than international standards, it requires nations to justify 
those stricter standards by science or a nondiscriminatory lower level 
of acceptable risk that does not target imports selectively.m 
Regarding human and animal life or health, the SPS Agreement 
defines risk assessment as: "[t]he evaluation of the potential for ad-
verse effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of 
additives, toxins, or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages, or 
foodstuffs. "174 Article 5 of the SPS Agreement specifies that a nation 
must have scientific evidence to justify levels of protection higher than 
the international standards or must show that it is "the appropriate 
level of ... protection. "175 As long as it demonstrates a scientific 
justification for a particular SPS standard, a member is free to choose 
its own level of protection once it determines that a bona fide health 
or safety risk exists_l76 
3. The EU's Interpretation of the Precautionary Principle 
The debate surrounding food safety and animal health issues, 
including the controversy surrounding the use of hormones in beef 
production, "raises the question of whether the SPS Agreement's 
preference for scientific evidence goes far enough in dealing with 
possible risks for consumers and producers."177 The EU has sought to 
clarify some of the issues surrounding the application of the Precau-
tionary Principle as it applies to the SPSAgreement.17s 
On February 2, 2000, the Commission submitted a document to 
the WTO articulating its interpretation of the Precautionary Princi-
ple.179 In this communication, the Commission stated that a "decision 
to take measures without waiting until all the necessary scientific 
knowledge is available is clearly a precaution-based approach. "180 Be-
cause "any assessment of risk that is made should be based on the ex-
isting body of scientific and statistical data," and "[m]ost decisions are 
17S HANRAHAN, supra note 5. 
174 Kennedy, supra note 169, at 86. 
175 !d. 
176 !d. 
177 SPS Committee Completes Draft on Risk "Consistency," NonciAS, Mar. 15-16, 2000, 
available at http:/ /www.wto.org/spanish/news_s/newsOO_s/sps_s.htm [hereinafter SPS 
Committee Completes Draft]. 
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taken where there is sufficient information available," the decision of 
whether to invoke the Precautionary Principle is one that is exercised 
where scientific data is insufficient, inconclusive, or uncertain.181 Fur-
thermore, the Precautionary Principle, under the Commission's in-
terpretation, is applied "where there are indications that the possible 
effects on the environment, or human, animal or plant health may be 
potentially dangerous and inconsistent with the chosen level of pro-
tection. "182 
The Precautionary Principle was recognized in international law 
in the World Charter for Nature, adopted by the United Nations 
(U.N.) General Assembly in 1982.183 At the 1992 U.N. Conference on 
Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, a declaration was 
adopted which stated, " [ w] here there are threats of serious or irre-
versible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environ-
mental degradation. "184 The Commission asserts that the Precaution-
ary Principle "has been progressively consolidated in international 
environmental law and so it has since become a full-fledged and gen-
eral principle of international law."185 While the term is never used 
explicitly, according to the Commission, the Precautionary Principle 
is reflected in Article 5.7 ofthe SPS Agreement.186 Article 5.7 states: 
[l]n cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a 
Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures on the basis of available scientific information, in-
cluding that from the relevant international organizations as 
well as from sanitary and phytosanitary measures applied by 
other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek 
to obtain the additional information necessary for a more 
objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phyto-
sanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of 
time.187 
The Commission notes that the WTO Appellate Body on Hormones 
has recognized "that there is no need to assume that Article 5. 7 ex-
181 Id. n 7, 8. 
182 !d. 'I 8. 
183 Id. 'I 24. 
184 PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 179, 'f 25. 
185 ld., 26. 
186 Id. 'I 29. 
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hausts the relevance of a Precautionary Principle."188 The Commis-
sion further contends that the Precautionary Principle is reflected in 
the Members' "right to establish their own level of sanitary protection, 
which level may be higher ... than that implied in existing interna-
tional standards, guidelines and recommendations. "189 In accordance 
with this interpretation of the Precautionary Principle, the Commis-
sion adopted its 1989 ban on GMOs.19o 
4. The Dispute 
Mter the SPS Agreement took effect, the United States requested 
a panel on April 25, 1996 and instituted formal dispute settlement 
proceedings under the WfO's Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU) in May, 1996.191 Thereafter, a panel was established on May 20, 
1996.192 The legal issue in the dispute was the scientific validity of the 
rationale for the EU's hormone ban, specifically, whether the use of 
GMOs in cattle could harm humans who consume the beef produced 
therefrom.193 If the EU's objective for the ban was found to be no 
more than political concern about the unpopularity of GMOs among 
European consumers and farmers, the ban would violate the EU's ob-
ligations under the SPS Agreement.I94 
In August, 1997, the WfO panel issued its report, finding that 
the hormone ban was not based on scientific evidence, risk assess-
ment, or relevant international standards.195 The panel found the 
Commission's "ban on imports of meat and meat products from cattle 
treated with any of six specific hormones for growth promotion pur-
poses" inconsistent with three articles of the SPS Agreement.196 Look-
ing to evidence presented during the dispute process, the panel 
found that beef growth hormones do not present any proven risk to 
human health.197 
The EU submitted notice of its intention to appeal certain issues 
of law and some of the WfO panel's legal interpretations on Septem-
188 !d. Annex II. 
189 PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 179, Annex II. 
190 See HANRAHAN, supra note 5. 
191 Stewart eta!., supra note 76, at 496, 500. 
192 !d. at 496. 
193 !d. at 500. 
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196 Stewart eta!., supra note 76, at 496. The Commission's ban on GMOs was found in-
consistent with Articles 3.1, 5.1, and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement. !d. 
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her 24, 1997.198 On appeal, the Commission defended its measures on 
the ground that they were based on the Precautionary Principle, 
which states that as long as there is some scientific basis for adopting a 
particular SPS measure, the measure complies with the SPS Agree-
ment.199 The Appellate Body agreed that the Precautionary Principle 
is reflected in Articles 5. 7 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement but declined 
to state whether the Principle was part of established international 
law.200 Agreeing with the panel, the Appellate Body found that, what-
ever its status in international law, the Precautionary Principle did not 
override the risk assessment provisions of the SPS Agreement; thus, 
the panel's finding was affirmed on january 16, 1998.201 
The Appellate Body found that the Commission's GMO meas-
ures: 
[F]ailed to satisfy the SPS Agreement on two counts: 1) all 
available scientific evidence, as well as the experts consulted 
by the panel, stated that the hormones in question [were] 
safe when used in accordance with good practice; and 2) the 
[Commission] had failed to conduct a risk assessment that 
satisfied the provisions of the SPS Agreement.2o2 
The Appellate Body report and the panel report, as modified, were 
adopted on February 13, 1998.203 
Once the reports were approved, the EU requested four years to 
implement the recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) and to bring itself into compliance with the SPS Agreement.204 
The United States, however, objected that it could not agree to such a 
prolonged implementation period.2°5 Hence, the matter was referred 
to a WfO arbitrator, who determined that the reasonable amount of 
time for implementation was fifteen months; this period would expire 
on May 13, 1999.206 At a meeting on April 28, 1999, the EU informed 
the DSB that it might not be able to comply with the recommenda-
tions by the May 13th deadline and stated that it would consider offer-
198 /d. at 496. 
199 Kennedy, supra note 169, at 95. 
200 /d. 
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ing compensation to the United States as an alternative.207 The 
United States subsequently requested authorization from the DSB to 
retaliate against the EU and its members "by suspending tariff conces-
sion on imports totaling $202 million. "2°8 The DSB referred the issue 
back to the original arbitration panel, and the arbitrators issued a re-
port on July 12, 1999, concluding the damages suffered by the United 
States as a result of the EU's failure to conform to SPS Agreement 
provisions would equal $116.8 million.209 Effective July 29, 1999, the 
United States imposed 100% ad valorem tariffs on selected import 
products from fourteen of the EU members. 210 "The level of trade af-
fected by the action equaled $116.8 million. "211 The increased tariffs 
remain in place as the EU has, in effect, chosen to "pay the penalty" 
for not conforming with the provisions of the SPS Agreement; the EU 
has sent the message that it would rather live with 100% tariffs on se-
lected exports to the United States than to remove the ban on 
GMOs.m 
V. OUTLOOK FOR RESOLUTION 
A. EU-U.S. lkterinary Agreement 
In July, 1999, the EU and the United States signed a veterinary 
agreement, which entered into force on August 1, 1999.213 The 
"agreement [was] the result of long and difficult negotiations. "214 In 
1997, the EU and the United States failed to meet an April 1st dead-
line for a Veterinary Equivalency Agreement (VEA) on poultry and 
meat inspection standards.215 Failure to reach such an agreement 
meant that the EU and the United States continued to set their own 
measures, "disrupt[ing] transatlantic trade in animal products and 
potentially contaminat[ing] other facets of the EU-US relation-
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ship. "216 In light of the mad cow epidemic, the EU asserted that the 
1997 discussions were about public health, and while VEA measures 
would have trade implications, the effect on trade was not the main 
concern.217 
Mter the 1999 Veterinary Agreement was signed, the Delegation 
of the European Commission to the United States announced: 
The objective of the agreement is to facilitate trade in live 
animals and animal products between the EU and the US by 
establishing a mechanism for the recognition of equivalence 
of sanitary measures operating in the two regions. The rec-
ognition by an importing country of the sanitary measures 
applied by an exporting country can permit greater 
efficiency in the utilization of inspection and verification re-
sources. 218 
The 1999 Veterinary Agreement included U.S. acceptance of the 
EU's regionalization principle, indicating "that an outbreak of an 
animal disease in a defined and restricted region need not result ... 
in a ban on trade."219 Furthermore, the 1999 Agreement lists com-
modities for which equivalence is recognized and implements a pro-
gram to work towards recognition for those commodities where 
equivalence is not recognized.22o Approximately $3 billion in EU-U.S. 
trade ($1.5 billion in each direction) was affected by the 1999 Veteri-
nary Agreement. 221 Notably, nothing changed EU legislation, and the 
1999 Veterinary Agreement took into account the rights and obliga-
tions of the EU and the United States under the SPS Agreement. 222 
B. lVTO Guidelines on Consistency 
In March, 2000, the VVTO's SPS Committee announced that it 
had completed a final draft for guidelines on "consistency. "223 Article 
5.5 of the SPS Agreement requires VVTO members to be consistent in 
how they deal with risk.224 Primarily, Article 5.5 seeks to codify the 
216 Jd. 
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concept of what "level of protection" the SPS Agreement provides.225 
The levels adopted by individual countries are not easy to specify, 
measure, and compare, as illustrated by the Hormone-Treated Meat 
Dispute. 226 
At its meeting on June 21 and 22, 2000, the SPS Committee 
adopted Guidelines to Further the Practical Implementation of Arti-
cle 5.5 (Guidelines).227 Article 5.5 states: 
With the objective of achieving consistency in the applica-
tion of the concept of appropriate level of sanitary or phyto-
sanitary protection against risks to human life or health, or 
to animal and plant life or health, each Member shall avoid 
arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it consid-
ers to be appropriate in different situations, if such distinc-
tions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on in-
ternational trade. Members shall cooperate in the 
Committee ... to develop guidelines to further the practical 
implementation of this provision.22s 
The SPS Committee specified that the Guidelines address two ele-
ments within Article 5.5: " ( 1) the objective of achieving consistency in 
the application of the concept of the appropriate level of protection 
and (2) the obligation to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions 
in the levels considered appropriate" when those distinctions hinder 
international trade.229 The Guidelines on consistency are not legally 
binding but "are intended as tools to help officials" implement the 
SPS Agreement ''when they make decisions on levels of health protec-
tion, and adopt and implement measures on food safety, or animal ... 
health. "23° Moreover, the Guidelines suggest means for officials to 
employ in dealing with difficulties in implementing consistent meas-
ures.231 
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B. European Food Authority 
In consideration of the BSE scandal and the controversy over 
meat hormones, the Commission proposed in January, 2000 to over-
haul the EU's food safety system.232 In its White Paper on Food Safety, 
the Commission proposed a number of "ambitious reforms. "233 The 
White Paper encompasses "all aspects of food products from "farm to 
table," and identifies as necessary over eighty separate actions to im-
prove food safety standards. "234 
Included among the Commission's propositions was the creation 
of a European Food Authority (EFA), which would be "entrusted with 
a number of key tasks embracing independent scientific advice on all 
aspects relating to food safety."235 The EFA's tasks would include the 
"operation of rapid alert systems, communication and dialogue with 
consumers on food safety and health issues as well as networking with 
national agencies and scientific bodies. "236 In designing the proposed 
European Food Authority, the Commission did not create an inde-
pendent regulatory body akin to the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion, which is authorized to promulgate regulations based on its own 
scientific findings.237 That duty, referred to as "risk management" in 
the White Paper, would be retained by the EU political bodies: the 
Commission, the EC, and the European Parliament.238 Under this 
format, "even a reformed EU food safety policy would continue to be 
governed by laws distinct from those of the [U.S.], posing barriers to 
transatlantic trade and triggering conflicts before international bodies 
such as the [WTO]. "239 
In November, 2000, the Commission put forward a proposal for 
regulation outlining the general principles of food law and establish-
ing EFA.240 EU Heads of State determined that efforts should be made 
to adopt this regulation as quickly as possible so that the EFA could 
232 See Jeffrey R. Bernstein, R-7zats So Scary About Trade, the WTO, and Globalization?, LA 
FoLLETTE PoL'Y REP., Fall, 2001, at 1, 12. 
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2002] Mad Cow Disease and EU-U.S. Relations 369 
begin operating in 2002.241 Under the proposed regulation, the EFA 
would have six main functions: (I) independent scientific opinions; 
(2) advice on technical food issues to underpin policy and regula-
tions; (3) collection and analysis of data to monitor food safety in the 
EU; (4) identification of emerging risks; (5) day-to-day operation of 
the rapid alert system covering both food and feed; and (6) a clear 
communication role to inform the public on all matters under its su-
pervision.242 
C. Labeling and GMOs 
U.S. federal law requires most imports, including many food 
items, to bear labels informing the ultimate purchaser of their coun-
try of origin.243 The Federal Meat Inspection Act also requires imports 
of beef and other meats to be labeled clearly as to their country of 
origin.244 Thus, while the U.S. supports labels based on products' ori-
gins, it has held firm to the position that genetically modified prod-
ucts are no different from non-genetically modified goods and, there-
fore, do not require distinct labels.245 The United States opposes 
mandatory labeling of products containing GMOs on the basis that 
available scientific evidence shows that genetically modified products 
are safe for human and animal consumption.246 
The EU contends that labels should be mandatory on all foods 
containing GM0s.247 According to the Commission's White Paper on 
Food Safety, labeling rules are necessary to ensure that consumers are 
provided with sufficient information to make informed decisions.248 
The Commission specifies that labels must include information on 
product characteristics, composition, storage, and use of the prod-
uct. 249 In addition, " [ o] perators should be free to provide more in-
formation on the label, provided this information is correct and not 
misleading. "250 To achieve its goal, the Commission stated that it will 
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pursue multilateral guidelines on labeling, given the fact that labeling 
has become a trade policy issue in regard to the SPS Agreement. 251 
On July 25, 2001, the Commission unveiled two new regulations 
calling for an EU-wide system to trace and label GMOs.252 According 
to the Commission, the new proposals ensure traceability by requiring 
business operators to transmit and retain information and to identify 
to whom and from where GMOs are made available.253 The legislation 
package also mandates labeling of all foods produced from GMOs 
and all genetically modified feed.254 Under the proposals, EFA would 
perform scientific risk assessment of GMOs, and its opinion would be 
made available to the public, who would then have the opportunity 
comment.255 Addressing the EU's proposed legislation on GMO label-
ing, David Byrne stated that, "[t]here is an irrational fear of [GMOs] 
in the EU. On the other hand, there are irrational fears [in the U.S.] 
about how [Europeans] are proposing to address the issue."256 Mr. 
Byrne further articulated that the new regulations, which must be ap-
proved by the Member States and thus are unlikely to enter into effect 
before 2003, were designed to provide reassurance to consumers.257 
CONCLUSION 
The mad cow crisis, which began as a veterinary nightmare, has 
evolved into a trade epidemic, threatening relations between the EU 
and the United States. Without a common vision and understanding 
between the two leaders of the global economy, the crisis could dete-
riorate the relationship further. Chaos marked the onset of the BSE 
crisis, as exemplified by the UK's failure to implement immediate 
preventative measures and seek outside counsel. The EU's lack of a 
cohesive plan of attack exacerbated what was already a grave situation. 
This state of affairs set the stage for world-wide panic and rendered 
inevitable preventative trade restrictions, such as those put into place 
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by the United States in an effort to protect its own cattle industry, as 
well as its citizens' health. The GMO controversy exemplifies the ap-
prehension in the EU stemming from the mad cow crisis. Now that 
the EU appears to have developed a comprehensive plan and has 
passed legislation rationally addressing the disaster, the disagreement 
over GMOs may be on its way to resolution. The Veterinary Agree-
ment between the United States and the EU is another indication that 
a mutual understanding between the two governments could be just 
around the corner. Guidelines from the WTO on the application of 
preventative measures also may prove to lend a hand in reaching a 
trade agreement. Although the EU and the United States soon may 
resolve their trade disagreement resulting from the BSE epidemic, the 
true battle against the disease will not terminate until scientists and 
health officials develop adequate methods of attacking both BSE and 
nvCJD. The EU and the United States clearly would benefit from a 
common vision on preventative measures in relation to BSE. By put-
ting their trade disagreements behind them, both nations might im-
prove their focus on the problem itself. 
